

AUTHORS' GUIDELINES FOR CCC KARGIL PROJECT

The synergy of the CCC doing an analytical study on the Kargil conflict lies in: one, this is a maiden attempt to portray a balanced and an impartial view of the conflict; second, versatility in composition of the team of authors comprising political scientists, military historians, army professionals and security analysts.

During the August 28-29 project workshop we decided to write two volumes; one a multi-authored edited book, and another a volume devoted to military aspects of the Kargil conflict. We listed ten chapters for the edited volume, which were disseminated to the authors as workshop briefs. Later addition have been two chapters on

“How Deterrence Operates in Context of South Asia, by Robert Jervis, and another on “Terrorism and Kargil,” by Chris Fair of RAND Corporation. Based on above, the outline of the edited volume is:

Asymmetric Warfare in South Asia: The Causes and Consequences of Kargil

- Chapter 1: Kargil conflict in political, military and historical context
Sumit Ganguly, University of Texas
- Chapter 2: Pakistan's motivations and calculations for the Kargil conflict
Zafar Iqbal Cheema, Oxford University
- Chapter 3: Kargil conflict and India; a systemic and an intelligence failure
James Wirtz, NPS and Surinder Rana, NPS
- Chapter 4: Analysis of military operations during the Kargil conflict
Jack Gill, NESACenter, NDU
- Chapter 5: Role of Non-state Actor in the Kargil Conflict *Chris Fair, RAND Organization*
- Chapter 6: Conflict management strategies of India, Pakistan and the U.S.
Peter Lavoy, NPS
- Chapter 7: The nuclear dimension
Scott Watson, DIA
- Chapter 8: Lessons of the Kargil conflict as learned by India
Rajesh Basrur
- Chapter 9: Lessons of the Kargil conflict as learned by Pakistan
Hassan Askar Rizvi
- Chapter 10: How deterrence operates in context of South Asia
Robert Jervis, Columbia University
- Chapter 11: Conclusion and policy recommendations
Peter Lavoy and Sumit Ganguly

Suggested Template for Chapter Writing

It is suggested that each chapter should have:

- ❑ A specific research question
- ❑ What is the debate on the issue?
- ❑ What is the authors' line of argument on this issue?
- ❑ How does author support his viewpoint (methodology)
- ❑ What is the new empirical contribution by the author for his readers?

Chapter 1: The basic question is what led to Kargil and how relevant is the study of Kargil conflict in the overall India-Pakistan rivalry? The ongoing debate is centered around differing viewpoints on both sides; Pakistan says that Kargil was a manifestation of growing strength of freedom struggle in Kashmir, which emboldened Jihadis in Kashmir to challenge Indian Army in an open combat. According to them India over-reacted to the situation that gave it an international hue. India calls Kargil as a stab in the back by Pakistan and a rebuff to its sincere efforts for lasting peace in the subcontinent, initiated through Lahore peace process.

Chapter 2: The specific question could be based on:

What exactly were Pakistan's military objectives in the Kargil conflict? What were the commensurate political objectives? Who were the principal planners of Kargil? To what extent was civilian authority involved and consulted? Did the planners have a sense of the endgame of the conflict? If so, what exactly was the preferred outcome (s)?

The debate is that through Kargil, Pakistan wanted to avenge Siachin. The other viewpoint is that Kargil was part of overall Pakistani strategy in Kashmir and avenging Siachin formed part of this strategy.

Chapter 3: The Kargil Conflict and India: systemic and intelligence failures

Why did India fail to anticipate this incursion? Was there a failure of civil-military intelligence coordination? Did civilian and military intelligence provide conflicting assessments of Pakistani motivations, calculations and strategies? To what extent did the "spirit of Lahore" influence Indian assessments of Pakistani motivations? Were there structural/organizational flaws that contributed to this intelligence failure?

A part of Indian media and the political establishment criticized Indian government and intelligence agencies for a gross failure. Indian government and official partly accede that they were surprised. However, citing some historical

examples the officials defended the system saying that even the US was surprised in the Pearl Harbor.

Chapter 4: Military Operations during Kargil

Did the Pakistanis really achieve "tactical success" and end up with "strategic failure"? Was the Indian military response simply improvised or did it reveal the existence of contingency plans that were modified to meet the threat? To what extent was the Indian response hobbled due to a belated awareness of the Pakistani incursion? To what extent the presence of nuclear weapons on the subcontinent influence the conduct of the war? How did civil-military relations function on both sides of the border during the conflict?

India claimed Kargil as a significant military victory. The US mediated Pakistani withdrawal is considered by Indians as a face saver for the Pakistan Army. On the other hand Pakistan's military establishment claims that Nawaz Sharif let down Pakistan by agreeing to the US suggestion of withdrawal. This according to Pakistani media also led to Nawaz Sharif's departure from power in the October 1999 military coup.

Chapter 5: Role of Non-state Actors in the Kargil Conflict

What was the involvement of non-state actors in the Kargil conflict, and what was the significance of their role?

The debate revolved around Pakistan's contention that Kargil operation was part of ongoing freedom struggle in Kashmir, and it was conducted by Mujahideen fighting in Kashmir. India countered by saying the it was Pakistan's military operation, and the militants played only a perfunctory role. This chapter will also highlight the role of non-state actors in wider context of India-Pakistan rivalry.

Chapter 6: Conflict Management Strategies of India, Pakistan and the United States

How did India seek to keep the conflict limited? How did Pakistan seek to keep the conflict limited? What role did the United States play in dampening the conflict? Did the U.S. believe that there was an explicit nuclear dimension to this conflict? If so, did it fear escalation to the nuclear level?

India is perceived by international media to have played a mature role by keeping the conflict limited. Kargil actually brought Kashmir issue in the world focus, however maybe not in the manner Pakistan wanted it to be. One significant aspect of this entire episode is that all major countries in the world insisted that Pakistan should respect the sanctity of the line of control (LOC) in Kashmir. Issue of debate therefore is whether international community would favor a Kashmir solution based upon a territorial status-quo.

Chapter 7: The Nuclear Dimension

What role did nuclear weapons play in this conflict? Did their mutual Possession encourages the Pakistani military? Had their presence made the Indian politico-military leadership more complacent about the dangers of an incursion across the Line of Control? How cognizant were military commanders on both sides of the risks of nuclear escalation? Were any veiled threats made to resort to nuclear weapons? Did this conflict illustrate the "stability/instability paradox"?

Pakistan considers its nuclear weapons capability as a balance to India's conventional superiority. The debatable issue is that will this new find sense of security encourage Pakistan to repeat Kargil?

Chapter 8: Lessons of Kargil conflict as Learnt by India

Is another "limited war" still possible and is it likely? Would the Indians respond differently in the event of a future crisis? If so, how? What assessment did the Indian political leadership make of the roles of external powers especially the United States and China?

Kargil was a military victory for India, some say it was a strategic stalemate. The issue is debatable.

Chapter 9: Lessons of the Kargil Conflict for Pakistan

What assessments did the Pakistani military make of the Indian politico-military response? What assessments did the Pakistani military make of the roles of the external powers especially the United States and China? What assessments did the Pakistani military make of their own performance?

Kargil conflict resulted in Nawaz Sharif's departure from Pakistan's political scene. What is debatable is whether return of a democratic government in Pakistan will make perceptible difference in the security and political situation in the region.

Chapter 10: Deterrence in South Asia?

Why did Indian conventional deterrence fail? Did the Pakistanis "design around" Indian deterrence? Did the mutual possession of nuclear weapons forestall escalation? Even though India avoided horizontal escalation (at least on land) was there a danger of nuclear escalation? What mutual steps can India and Pakistan take to strengthen both convention and nuclear deterrence?

South Asia is a nuclear flashpoint. Is it really so?

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